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Life emerged on the Earth within the first quintile of its habitable win-
dow, but a technological civilization did not blossom until its last. Ef-
forts to infer the rate of abiogenesis, based on its early emergence,
are frustrated by the selection effect that if the evolution of intelli-
gence is a slow process, then life’s early start may simply be a pre-
requisite to our existence, rather than useful evidence for optimism.
In this work, we interpret the chronology of these two events in a
Bayesian framework, extending upon previous work by considering
that the evolutionary timescale is itself an unknown that needs to be
jointly inferred, rather than fiducially set. We further adopt an objec-
tive Bayesian approach, such that our results would be agreed upon
even by those using wildly different priors for the rates of abiogene-
sis and evolution - common points of contention for this problem. It
is then shown that the earliest microfossil evidence for life indicates
that the rate of abiogenesis is at least 2.8 times more likely to be a
typically rapid process, rather than a slow one. This modest limiting
Bayes factor rises to 8.7 if we accept the more disputed evidence of
13C depleted zircon deposits (Bell et al. 2015). For intelligence evo-
lution, it is found that a rare-intelligence scenario is slightly favored
at 3:2 betting odds. Thus, if we re-ran Earth’s clock, one should sta-
tistically favor life to frequently re-emerge, but intelligence may not
be as inevitable.
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A fundamental question to modern science concerns theprevalence of life, and intelligence, within the Universe.
At the time of writing, searches for non-terrestrial life within
the Solar System have not yielded any direct evidence for life
(1–3), and the remote detection of chemical biomarkers on
extrasolar planets remains years ahead of present observational
capabilities (4–7). The search for intelligence, through the
signatures of their technology, may be detectable under cer-
tain assumptions (8–11) and limited observational campaigns
have been attempted (12). However, the underlying assump-
tions make it challenging to use these null results to directly
constrain the prevalence of life or intelligence at this time.
Despite having no observational data concerning non-
terrestrial life, we are in possession of stronger constraints
when it comes to life on Earth. Until this situation changes,
inferences concerning the existence of life elsewhere in the
Universe must unfortunately rely heavily on this single data
point (13). Whilst a single data point is not ideal, it is cer-
tainly not devoid of information either (14). This is even true
when strong selection biases are in play, such as the fact our
existence is predicated on at least one previously successful
abiogenesis event.
Problems such as these lend themselves to Bayesian analysis,
where the biases can be encoded into the inference framework.
The 2012 seminal paper of Spiegel & Turner (13) applied this
to the question of abiogenesis. In that work, the authors treat
abiogenesis as a Poisson process, which holds for systems with
a discrete number of successes in a finite interval. This is used
to define a likelihood function that accounts for the possibility
of multiple successes and the selection effect that a success is
demanded for us to observe ourselves. The authors conclude
that the priors ultimately dominate their posteriors, and that
even choosing between three reasonable and diffuse priors leads
to greatly different answers. Accordingly, it’s very difficult to
use the model to say anything definitive about how difficult
or easy abiogenesis really is.
Intuitively, the possibility that life typically emerges slowly
seems highly improbable given its relativity quick start on the
Earth (15–18). Indeed, some commentators have remarked
that this fact implies that “life is not a fussy, reluctant and
unlikely thing” (ref. (19), p. 501). The plausibility of the
slow start scenario can be understood to be a consequence
of the selection effect, which requires that life emerges fast
enough for us to have sufficient time to evolve into complex
(“intelligent”) organisms capable of observing ourselves. The
early emergence of life on Earth then becomes consistent with
a low abiogenesis rate, since worlds where life does not emerge
quickly never evolve to the point of an intelligent observer.
This reveals the important role that the evolutionary
timescale plays in the inference problem, since it strongly
shapes the selection bias effect. In the Bayesian analysis of
(13), the evolutionary timescale is not known a-priori and thus
is set to three different fiducial values (1, 2 and 3.1Gyr) in
order to test the sensitivity of their results to this parameter.
In this work, we extend the model to allow the evolutionary
timescale to itself now become an inferred parameter. Rather
than assume several fiducial values, this parameter can be
learnt by conditioning upon the time it took for observers to
evolve. This enables a joint posterior distribution between the
rate of abiogenesis and the rate of intelligence evolution that
Significance Statement
Does life’s early emergence mean that it would re-appear
quickly if we were to re-run Earth’s clock? If the timescale
for intelligence evolution is very slow, then a quick start to life is
actually necessary for our existence - and thus doesn’t neces-
sarily mean it’s a generally quick process. Employing objective
Bayesianism and a uniform-rate process assumption, we use
just the chronology of life’s appearance in the fossil record, that
of ourselves, and Earth’s habitability window, to infer the true
underlying rates accounting for this subtle selection effect. Our
results find betting odds of >3:1 that abiogenesis is indeed a
rapid process versus a slow and rare scenario, but 3:2 odds
that intelligence may be rare.
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encodes the covariance between the two. This not only yields a
more robust estimate for the abiogenesis rate by marginalizing
over the uncertainty in the evolutionary timescale, but it also
infers the evolutionary timescale.
The Joint Likelihood Function
Distribution of success times. Following earlier work (13, 20–
22), we describe abiogenesis as uniform rate (i.e. Poisson)
process, defined by a rate parameter λL. As with (13), we
caution that this does not imply that abiogenesis is a truly
single step, instantaneous event. Rather, we interpret the
process to be a model which “integrates out” the likely complex
and multi-step chemistry which culminates in life. Indeed, it
may be that a variety of pathways can lead to abiogenesis, but
this ensemble is grouped into a single process where any of
them succeeding counts as a success for the ensemble. Further,
it is not necessary to strictly define what is meant by “life”
here, only that the success of this Poisson process ultimately
led to the geological evidence for life, and that without it said
evidence would not exist.
The assumption of a uniform-rate process over some time
interval can at first seem problematic when one considers the
stark changes to Earth’s environment over its history. However,
much of this change is due to life affecting it’s environment
and thus is a consequence of a success. The abiogenesis rate
may indeed be different after life begins, but it’s also irrelevant
since our model only cares about the first success.
With these points in mind, we can now write that in a time
interval tL, the probability of obtaining at least one successful
abiogenesis event (XL > 0) will be
Pr(XL > 0;λL, tL) =1− Pr(XL = 0;λL, tL),
=1− e−λLtL . [1]
The time interval between successes for a Poisson process
follows an exponential distribution. This can be demonstrated
by noting that eq. (1) corresponds to the probability of ob-
taining at least one success over the interval of time tL, and
thus can be understood as the cumulative probability distribu-
tion for the achievement of at least one success by that time.
Accordingly, the probability density function the first success
with respect to tL must be given by the derivative of eq. (1)
with respect to time, yielding
Pr(tL|λL) = λLe−λLtL . [2]
We now deviate from the approach of (13) by considering
a second process, labelled by “I” for “intelligence” , which
can only proceed once the previous process (“L”) is successful.
The inverse of this process’ rate parameter, λI , describes the
characteristic timescale it takes for evolution to develop from
the earliest forms of life, to an “intelligent observer” which
is carefully defined in the next subsection. We truncate the
times, such that both processes have to occur within a finite
time T . Since process I can only proceed once process L has
occured, then this requires tL + tI < T . The joint distribution
of times tL and tI is therefore given by
Pr(tL, tI |λL, λI) ∝
{
λLλIe
−λLtL−λI tI if tL + tI < T,
0 otherwise .
[3]
Imposing the condition of tL + tI < T serves to truncate
the joint distribution and thus the above is formally a propor-
tionality because it is not yet normalized. After normalization,
the expression becomes
Pr(tL, tI |λL, λI) =
{
λLλI (λL−λI )e−λLtL−λItI
λL(1−e−λIT )−λI (1−e−λLT )
if tL + tI < T,
0 otherwise .
[4]
Accounting for observational constraints. Before we discuss
how eqn. 4 can be updated to incorporated to include observa-
tional constraints, it is first useful to define exactly what we
mean by “intelligence” in this work. We adopt a functional
view of this term, consider that a successful event from process
I is defined as some kind of transition - which occurs after
abiogenesis - which is fundamentally necessary in order for
analyses such as the one presented here to be possible. In
other words, this type of analysis is only possible because
process I succeeded, and would be impossible if it failed.
Expounding upon this, we can consider that process I re-
sults in an observer/entity/society capable of i) obtaining and
dating geological evidence pertaining to the early emergence
of life ii) the ability to model the future climatic conditions of
their world such that the habitability window can be estimated,
and iii) interpret the ramifications of this information regard-
ing the underlying rates of abiogenesis and evolution. For
the sake of brevity we’ll refer to such outcomes as intelligent
observers in what follows. Formally, these three conditions are
not equivalent to a technological civilization, but this author
would argue that it’s difficult to imagine how these feats would
be possible in absence of one.
In what follows, we will attribute process I to corre-
spond to the emergence of human civilization and thus
will further assume that no previous Earth dwelling enti-
ties/observers/societies have had the capacity to satisfy the
three conditions discussed above. This assumption would be
invalidated if the “Silurian hypothesis” of (23) were confirmed,
which considers the possible existence of industrial civilizations
pre-dating humanity (24), in which case we would certainly
advocate revisiting the calculations that will be described in
this paper.
The emergence of human civilization could be defined in a
variety of ways. Some possible defining “moments” could be
the appearance of hominids, use the evolution of homo-sapiens,
complex language, the neolithic revolution, or the first radio
transmissions into space. Whatever we use, this only shifts tI
around by several million years at most. Since tI is of order
of several Gyr, these disagreements have negligible impact on
our final results and thus tI will be treated as a fixed quantity.
This is not true for the first transition, since it seems to
have occurred relatively quick and the uncertainty associated
with it is comparable to the actual timing. Further, it is not
possible to accurately date the emergence of life, since any life
could (and indeed must) have begun prior to its appearance
in the geological record. Accordingly, the true date for the
emergence of life, tL, must pre-date the actual observation, t′L,
i.e. tL < t′L. The probability of this can be calculated through
integration:
2 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.XXXXXXXXXX Kipping
Pr(tL < t′L, tI |λL, λI) =
∫ t′L
tL=0
Pr(tL, tI |λL, λI)dtL. [5]
Since tI is defined as the time since tL, then one cannot
directly measure this value either. However, we can state that
its value is somewhere between t′I and t′I + t′L, where t′I is the
observed time difference between the emergence of intelligence
and the first evidence for life. This allows us to write our final
likelihood function as
L =Pr(tL < t′L, t′I < tI < t′I + t′L|λL, λI)
=
∫ t′I+t′L
tI=t′I
Pr(tL < t′L, tI |λL, λI)dtI . [6]
Evaluating the above yields a piecewise closed-form likeli-
hood function which is given in the SI Appendix. The func-
tion has two sub-domains, one which applies to the interval
T > 2t′L+t′I , and one which applies to T < 2t′L+t′I . As shown
later, the former case is applicable when t′L < 0.904Gyr and
we plot this function in fig. 1 against λL and λI , along with
the limiting behaviors (see the SI Appendix).
It is interesting to note that the likelihood function is not
monotonic and has a global maximum which can be solved for
numerically. For example, using the “optimistic” data defined
in the next section, it occurs at λˆI → 0 and λˆL = 21.8Gyr−1
(the full behavior is shown in the SI Appendix). However,
along the λI → 0 axis, the likelihood is almost flat beyond this
peak. For example, with the same data, the likelihood is 52.7%
of the peak when one sets λL = λˆL/10, but only 99.4% of the
peak when one sets λL = 10λˆL. Whilst maximum likelihood
parameters are instructive, we turn to Bayesian inference to
determine the posterior distributions and rigorously compare
different model scenarios.
Adopted values for the observational data. To perform any
inference with our likelihood function, one first needs to assign
values to the observables t′L and t′I , as well as T . All three
times are relative to some initial time when conditions on
Earth became suitable for life to emerge, and so let us first
discuss how to define this initial time.
There is of course uncertainty about the conditions on the
early Earth and when they became suitable for life (25–27).
The Earth is generally thought to have been impacted by
a Mars-sized body, dubbed “Theia”, 4.51Gyr ago in a cata-
clysmic event that formed the Moon (28). Such an impact
would have been a globally sterilizing event, and indeed may
have been accompanied by another sterilizing impactor, “Mon-
eta”, 40Myr later (29). Mineralogical evidence from zircons
indicates that both an atmosphere and liquid water must have
been present on the Earth’s surface (4.404± 0.008)Gyr ago
(30). In this work, we consider these to be the necessary basic
requirements for abiogenesis to take place and thus adopt
T = 4.408Gyr throughout. As noted by (13), a step-function
like transition from uninhabitable to habitable is surely too
simplistic, but our ignorance of Earth’s early history and in-
deed the conditions necessary for life mean that we do not at
present have a well-motivated complex model to impose in its
place.
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Fig. 1. The joint likelihood function for the rate of abiogenesis, λL, and the rate of
intelligence emergence, λI (for cases where T > 2t′L + t
′
I ). Contours relative to
the maximum likelihood position (gray circle) are depicted by gray lines, where one
can see a preference against low λL values. The limiting behaviors of the likelihood
function are shown along the edges of the figure.
The earliest evidence for life arrives soon after this time,
in the form of 13C depleted carbon inclusions within 4.1Gyr
old zircon deposits (17). The source of this depletion remains
controversial but this would yield an optimistic estimate of
t′L = 0.304Gyr. The earliest direct and undisputed evidence
for life comes from microfossils discovered in 3.465Gyr old
rocks in western Australia (15, 16, 18), yielding t′L = 0.939Gyr.
We highlight that, in both the optimistic and conservative
case, t′L is much larger than the 76Myr uncertainty as to when
the Earth became habitable and thus is not a dominant source
of uncertainty.
For t′I , for reasons discussed in the previous subsection
we can simply attribute this time to be the modern era. We
therefore adopt intelligent observing as arriving “now” such
that t′I = 4.404Gyr− t′L in what follows.
Finally, we turn to T , which defines the interval over which
the Earth is expected to persist as habitable. It’s important
that we refine this definition to be habitable for intelligent
beings, such as ourselves. If the Earth evolves into a state
where only simple microbial life is possible, then a success
can no longer occur for process I. As the Sun evolves, its
luminosity will increase, which in turn increases the rate of
weathering of silicate rocks on the Earth (31). This increased
weathering draws down carbon from the atmosphere, thus
gradually depleting the atmospheric content of carbon dioxide.
Once levels drop below ∼10 ppm, plant C4-photosynthesis will
no longer be viable (32), leading to their imminent demise.
It also possible that higher temperatures and the progressive
loss of Earth’s oceans could also trigger an earlier die off (33).
The end of plant life leads to a collapse in both the food
chain and Earth’s oxygen productivity, upon which animal life
is critically dependent. Large endotherms, such as mammals
and birds, will be the first to become extinct as a result of
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their higher oxygen requirements (31, 34). Thus, one can
reasonably consider that the habitable window for intelligence
decidedly ends once the reign of plant life comes to a close.
The timing for this is predicted to be 0.9Gyr by (33), a value
which is adopted in what follows to give T = 5.304Gyr.
In summary, we set T = 5.304Gyr but consider two values
for t′L of t′L = 0.304Gyr (“optimistic”) and t′L = 0.939Gyr
(“conservative”). This in turn gives two values of t′I of t′I =
4.404Gyr− t′L.
The Non-Objective λ Power-Law Prior
The role of the prior. Equipped with a likelihood function, one
may infer the a-posteriori distribution of λL & λI using Bayes’
theorem:
Pr(λL, λI |t′L, t′I) = Pr(t
′
L, t
′
I |λL, λI)Pr(λL, λI)∫ ∫
Pr(t′L, t′I |λL, λI)Pr(λL, λI) dλL dλI
.
[7]
In any Bayesian inference problem, the posterior is a prod-
uct of the likelihood and the prior and thus is affected by
both. In cases where one possesses little or no information
about the target parameters in advance, such as here, the
ideal prior should be minimally informative (“diffuse”) such
that it doesn’t strongly influence the result (35). In objective
Bayesianism, the resulting posterior should be expected to
be universally be agreed upon by everyone (36) - whereas a
subjective Bayesian would argue that probability corresponds
to the degree of personal belief (37).
When equipped with strongly constraining data, even those
using different diffuse priors will generally find convergent solu-
tions, since the likelihood overwhelms the prior thus naturally
leading to objective Bayesianism. This is certainly not the
case for our problem, since it has already been established
that the posterior for λL is very sensitive to the priors (13). In
such a case, one should tread carefully and seek a prior which
can be objectively defined, such that other parties could agree
upon the choice of prior and thus the resulting posterior.
We therefore proceed by considering how to define a prior
distribution which is minimally informative and also not de-
pendent upon subjective choices of the prior distribution pa-
rameters. However, we will later show that several important
inference statements can be made independent of the prior.
Power-law in λ. In previous work (13, 22), the a-priori distri-
bution for λL was assumed to be of the form λnL - a power-law.
In extending the likelihood to include λI , one may similarly
extend this power-law prior to encompass λI by writing that
Pr(λL, λI) = Pr(λL)Pr(λI) (i.e. assuming independence),
where
Pr(λ) =
{
λ−1
log(λmax)−log(λmin) if n = −1,
(n+1)λn
λn+1max−λn+1min
otherwise . [8]
For n = 0, this returns a uniform in λ prior, for n = −1 a
uniform in log λ prior and for n = −2 a uniform in λ−1 prior;
the three priors considered by (13). In adopting a prior of this
form, one must choose values for three shape parameters: the
index, n and the prior bounds λmin and λmax.
Assigning the prior shape parameters. In (13), the favored
index was n = −1 on the basis that a log-uniform prior
exhibits scale-invariance ignorance for λ. For a real-valued
parameter constrained only by a minimum and maximum
threshold, n = −1 also corresponds to the Jeffreys prior - a
standard approach to defining objective priors (35). However,
in this case, the n = −1 power-law is not actually objective
since one cannot objectively define a minimum and maximum
threshold. Because a power-law prior does not have semi-
infinite support from λ = 0 to λ =∞, then these prior bounds
have to be subjectively chosen.
For these bounds, (13) set λmax = 103 Gyr−1 somewhat
arbitrarily and a range of plausible values was offered for
λmin. Whilst useful as an exercise to test the sensitivity of
the posterior to the prior, this approach does not enable an
objectively defined solution. In an effort to objectively assign a
power-law prior, we consider here imposing the condition that
the prior should be fair and unbiased, which we will define in
what follows.
As currently stated, the prior in eqn. (8) appears reason-
ably diffuse for n = 0, −1 and −2, and the bounds could
essentially be anything. However, it is worth recalling that the
Poisson model is used as a vehicle to describe the Bernoulli
probability of one or more successful events occurring. Accord-
ingly, a natural alternative parameterization for this problem
is to consider the fraction of experiments in which the Pois-
son processes culminate in at least one success, fL and fI .
Although these terms are similar to the fractions defined in
the Drake Equation (38), here an “experiment” really refers
to re-running Earth’s history back and observing how the
stochastic processes play out each time (rather than some
other world). Since f = 1− e−λT , then the power-law prior
in λ is transformed into f -space as
Pr(f) = n+ 11− f
(− log(1− f))n
(− log(1− fmax))n+1 − (− log(1− fmin))n+1 .
[9]
Recall that we seek to define a prior which is both fair and
unbiased. For a Bernoulli process, such as a coin-toss, a “fair”
prior can be defined as one for which the chance of a positively-
loaded coin is no more or less likely than negatively-loaded
one. Accordingly, in our problem, we define a fair prior as one
which does not a-priori favor either an optimistic (f > 1/2) or
pessimistic (f < 1/2) world-view. This can be quantified by
defining the prior odds ratio between the two scenarios using
F:
F ≡
∫ fmax
f=1/2 Pr(f)df∫ 1/2
f=fmin
Pr(f)df
. [10]
Setting F = 1, one may solve for fmax (which corresponds
to λmax) as a function of fmin (corresponding to λmin):
lim
F→1
λmax =

(log 2)2
T2λmin
if n = −1,(
(2 log 2)n+1−(λminT )n+1
)1/(n+1)
T
otherwise .
[11]
Although this ensures a fair prior (subject to our definition),
it does not necessarily ensure an unbiased one. An unbiased
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Fig. 2. Marginalized posterior distribution (solid lines) for λL (far-left), λI (mid-left), fL (mid-right) and fI (far-right) using the log-uniform λ prior (dashed lines) and the
optimistic data. Top-row assumes λmin = 10−3 Gyr−1 and bottom-row assumes λmin = 10−6 Gyr−1. The y-axis scale is chosen to higlight the dynamic range.
prior is defined here as one for which the a-priori expectation
value of f , given by E[f ] ≡ ∫ fmax
fmin
fPr(f)df , equals one-half.
After imposing the F = 1 constraint enabled by eqn. (11), we
evaluate E[f ] in the limit of fmin → 0 as a function of n. This
reveals for n = −1, the expectation value converges to a half,
as desired for an unbiased prior (see the SI Appendix). The
only other value of n in the range −1 < n < 2 that yields
a fair and unbiased distribution is n = −0.709..., but this is
shown in the SI Appendix to require an overly restrictive prior
bound limit and thus is not used.
Using these two constraints, our fair and unbiased prior
for λ takes the form λ−1, with bounds following the relation-
ship given by eqn. (11). Unfortunately, our two constraints
applied to three parameters is insufficient to uniquely define
the prior - it is still necessary to choose λmin subjectively. The
posterior could still be argued to be objective if it were found
to be broadly insensitive to the choice of λmin - however this
unfortunately turns out to be false, as shown in what follows.
Resulting posteriors. To compute marginalized posteriors, we
initially tried sampling using Markov Chain Monte Carlo
and nested sampling techniques, but found that the resulting
posteriors were too poorly sampled in the tails. Instead, we
directly integrate the posterior density in each parameter. For
example, for the λL marginalized posterior, we slide along
in a fine grid of λL values and numerically integrate (using
the Gauss-Kronrod Rule) the joint posterior density over the
limits λI = λmin to λI = λmax.
The resulting marginalized posteriors are shown in fig. (2)
for two arbitrary choices of λmin: 10−3 Gyr−1 and 10−6 Gyr−1.
As can be seen from that figure, and perhaps not surprisingly,
the resulting distributions are certainly sensitive to the choice
of λmin. In conclusion, we argue here that a λ power-law prior
is simply unacceptable as an objective prior for this problem.
The Objective Bernoulli Prior
Fair and unbiased priors with semi-infinite support. Since we
have no way of objectively choosing λmin, then a fair and
unbiased (subject to our definitions) power-law prior in λ does
not provide a viable path to defining an objective posterior.
Rather than prescribing a prior in λ-space and then evalu-
ating its fairness and bias in f -space, we consider here simply
writing down a fair and unbiased prior in f -space directly.
Since f represents a fraction, it can be interpreted as the
Bernoulli probability of a success over the interval T . For a
Bernoulli process, a so-called Haldane prior (39) of the form
∝ (f(1− f))−1 was argued by the objective Bayesian Jaynes
to represent the least informative prior (36). Such a prior is
fair and unbiased by construction, and places extreme weight
on the solutions f = 1 and f = 0 at the expense of interme-
diate values. The intuition behind this is that either a very
small fraction of planets will be successful or almost all of
them, but is unlikely the laws of nature are tuned such that
approximately half of the planets are successful.
Using the Fisher information matrix, one can define that
the Jeffreys prior for a Bernouilli distribution. The solution is
not the Haldane prior, but rather a softer variant of the form
∝ (f(1− f))−1/2. This translates to a prior in λ space given
by
Pr(λ) = T
pi
√
eλT − 1 . [12]
Both the Haldane and Jeffreys priors are fair and unbiased
with respect to f and indeed any prior of the more general
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form ∝ (f(1 − f))n satisfies these conditions. However, the
n = −1 case, corresponding to the Haldane prior, is improper
and indeed leads to an improper posterior too, but for all
other n > −1 the prior can be normalized to a finite quantity.
Accordingly, the Jeffreys prior is fair, unbiased, objectively
defined and proper over the interval f = [0, 1]. Since f = 0
corresponds to λ = 0 and f = 1 corresponds to λ = ∞,
this naturally yields a proper prior with semi-infinite support
in λ, something which was not possible with the power-law
case discussed earlier. Together, these properties make the
distribution well-suited for our problem and we argue it solves
the dilemma faced in earlier work (13).
Although we consider the Jeffreys prior to be the ideal
objective prior for our problem, it is instructive to consider
posteriors with n = 0 (a uniform prior in f) as well, which has
a λ-space form of
Pr(λ) = Te−λT . [13]
Bayes factors independent of the λ prior. Equipped with our
likelihood function and prior, one may now sample/integrate
the posterior probability distribution to compute marginalized
distributions. Marginalization irreversibly bakes the prior into
the resulting collapsed posteriors, but specific probabilistic
statements can be made in a Bayesian framework without
marginalizing. In particular, we consider here an exercise in
Bayesian model comparison, where we seek to compare four
models,M, defined as the unique corners of the parameters
volume:
• M00: λL  1/t′L and λI  1/t′I
• M01: λL  1/t′L and λI  1/t′I
• M10: λL  1/t′L and λI  1/t′I
• M11: λL  1/t′L and λI  1/t′I
Binarizing the parameter volume into these four camps may
at first seem arbitrary - what about intermediate values? How-
ever, this partitioning is consistent with objective Bayesianism.
The objective Bernoulli prior treats life/intelligence as being ei-
ther very rare or very common, but unlikely to be finely-tuned
such that it approaches the intermediate value of one-half -
thus motivating the models above.
Conditioned upon some available data, D,
one may express that the odds ratio be-
tween two models as Pr(M1|D)/Pr(M2|D) =
[Pr(D|M1)/Pr(D|M2)][Pr(M1)/Pr(M2)]. The terms
inside the first square bracket is known as the Bayes factor,
which equals the odds factor under the simple assumption
that no model is a-priori preferred over any other. The Bayes
factor is ratio of two “evidences” given by Z ≡ Pr(D|M),
and for the four models defined above, Z can be expressed
analytically and independent of the prior pi(λL, λI). This can
be seen by noting that, for example with modelM00:
Z00 =Pr(
D︷︸︸︷
t′L, t
′
I |
M00︷ ︸︸ ︷
λL  1/t′L, λI  1/t′I)
= lim
λL1/t′L
lim
λI1/t′I
Pr(t′L, t′I |λL, λI)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=L
[14]
Thus, the evidences of these four corner models is inde-
pendent of the prior of pi(λL, λI), meaning that even those
adopting different priors would consistently agree on the Bayes
factors. We note that (13) used a similar strategy and we
provide an alternative explanation of this prior-free model
comparison in the SI Appendix, in terms of the Savage-Dickey
ratio (40).
In practice, Bayes factors for the two corners with rapid in-
telligence emergence (λI  1/t′I) tend to zero, since this is the
behavior of the likelihood function (see the SI Appendix). This
can be understood by the fact that if the rate of intelligence
emergence were extremely fast, then it would be incompatible
with taking as long as it did here on Earth. In contrast, life
could emerge much faster than t′L because t′L only represents
the first appearance of life in the geological record, not the
actual date of abiogenesis.
Since these two corners are zero, we instead compare models
M10 to M00. This represents the Bayes factor between a
scenario where abiogenesis is a fast versus a slow process
conditional upon the premise that intelligence emergence is
itself a slow process. In this case, we find
Z10
Z00 =
{
T
2t′
L
if T > 2t′L + tI ,
Tt′L
4(T−t′
I
)t′
L
−2t′
L
−(T−t′
I
)2 if T < 2t
′
L + tI ,
[15]
which evaluates to (Z10/Z00) = 8.73 and 2.83 for the opti-
mistic and conservative data inputs respectively. The above
also reveals the dependency on T is nearly linear; if T is revised
significantly up then optimism for life would also increase. We
highlight that Z10 < Z00 if t′L > 3.72Gyr - i.e. if the earliest
evidence for life were from no earlier than 680Myr ago, we
would conclude that abiogenesis was an improbable event.
If we relax the assumption that λI  1/t′I and let intelli-
gence become faster, then the Bayes factor monotonically rises,
as shown in fig. 3. This therefore means that the Bayes factor
of a quick versus slow abiogenesis scenario must be greater
than the limiting case of Z10/Z00, irrespective of whatever
value λI takes (or indeed whatever the prior is).
On this basis, we can conclude that even with the most
conservative date for the emergence of life, a scenario where
abiogenesis occurs rapidly is at least three times more likely
than a slow emergence, independent of the priors and even
the timescale it takes for intelligence to emerge. If the more
ambiguous evidence for an earlier start to life is confirmed
(17), then this would increase the odds to a factor of nine,
representing relatively strong preference for a model where life
would consistently emerge rapidly on the Earth, if time were
replayed.
Bayes factors after marginalization. Thus far we have avoided
using the marginalized posteriors, which has the benefit of
enabling model comparison independent of the prior pi(λL, λI).
However, it also has the disadvantage that we can only compare
conditional scenarios. For example, our result for (Z10/Z00) is
a Bayes factor conditional upon the assumption of a slow intel-
ligence emergence. Whilst it turns out this can be interpreted
as a lower limit on a fast versus slow abiogenesis scenario,
marginalization allows for a calculation which integrates over
the uncertainty in λI . For example, one may write that the
evidence for a model where λL  1/t′L (slow abiogenesis)
marginalized over λI is given by
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Fig. 3. A: Bayes factor between a model where life emerges rapidly (λL  1/t′L)
versus slowly (λL  1/t′L) on the Earth. A quick start is favored by at least
a factor of three conditioned upon early microfossil evidence, independent of our
assumptions regarding the evolutionary timescale of intelligent observers and priors on
the abiogenesis rate. B: Bayes factor of a scenario where intelligent observers typically
emerge much longer than occurred on Earth, versus the ensemble of possibilities.
There is a weak preference for a rare intelligence scenario.
ZL−slow =
∫ ∞
λI=0
(
lim
λL1/t′L
L
)
pi(λI)dλI . [16]
We numerically evaluated the evidences for ZL−slow using
the above, ZL−slow (λL  1/t′L) as well as ZI−slow (λI  1/t′I)
and the ensemble evidence over all possibilities, Zensemble.
As before, the fast intelligence emergence scenario has zero
evidence since the likelihood tends to zero in this regime,
for reasons discussed earlier. The resulting Bayes factors for
(ZL−fast/ZL−slow) are shown in panel A of fig. 3 by the closed
(Jeffreys prior) and open (uniform prior) circles.
The two sets of points are almost indistinguishable and
consistently lie above our previously derived lower limit on
the Bayes factor, as expected. Using the optimistic data, we
find that (ZL−fast/ZL−slow) = 9.538 and (ZL−fast/ZL−slow) =
9.648 for the Jeffreys and uniform priors respectively, both of
which satisfy (ZL−fast/ZL−slow) > (Z10/Z00) = 8.73. For the
conservative data, these numbers become (ZL−fast/ZL−slow) =
3.110 and (ZL−fast/ZL−slow) = 3.137, again satisfying
(ZL−fast/ZL−slow) > (Z10/Z00) = 2.83.
Further understanding of these Bayes factors can be gained
by evaluating the marginalized posteriors. We numerically
marginalizing the posteriors in the case of the optimistic data
and show the resulting distributions in fig. 4. From these, one
can see that the fL → 0 limit drops below the prior, whereas
the fL → 1 limit rises above it. Together, these results paint a
consistent picture that the timing of life’s emergence, and that
of intelligent observers, favor the hypothesis that life would
likely re-emerge rapidly on the Earth were the clock to be
re-ran.
And what of intelligence?. Thus far, we have calculated Bayes
factors concerning fast versus slow abiogenesis rates. For
the rate of emergence of intelligent observers, Bayes fac-
tors against a fast emergence scenario tend to infinity, since
limλI1/t′I L → 0 (as shown in the SI Appendix). Instead,it is more useful to compare the slow intelligence scenario
(λI  1/t′I) against the ensemble of models where λI can take
any value, for which the Bayes factor is
ZI−slow
Zensemble =
∫∞
λL=0
(
limλI1/t′I L(λL, λI)
)
pi(λL)dλL∫∞
λL=0
∫∞
λI=0
L(λL, λI)pi(λL)pi(λI)dλIdλL
. [17]
We evaluated the above numerically using optimistic data
to yield 1.638 and 1.474 using the Jeffreys and uniform priors
respectively. Switching to the conservative data paints barely
affects these numbers with 1.572 and 1.416 (the full range of
possibilities is depicted in panel B of fig. 3). This suggests a
slight preference, 3:2 betting odds, that intelligent observers
would rarely re-emerge - a value which is broadly robust against
the two priors considered and the range of possible t′L values.
Conclusions
In this work, we have attempted to build upon the seminal
paper of (13) which devised a Bayesian formalism for inter-
preting life’s early emergence on Earth. Unlike that work, we
do not treat the timescale for life to develop into intelligent
observers as a fixed quantity, but rather infer it jointly as a
free parameter. This important difference feeds into an overall
theme of the analysis presented here - to present an objective
Bayesian analysis of life’s early emergence on Earth, and our
relatively late arrival within the context of Earth’s habitable
window.
In this vein, we have demonstrated that the commonly
used power-law prior for this problem is not objective as the
results strongly depend on arbitrary choices on the prior’s
domain. We show that priors on the Bernoulli probability
of life/intelligence emerging naturally provide semi-infinite
support and yield distribution which can be seen to be fair
and unbiased for this problem. Even so, it is possible to
derive numerous model comparison results which are fully
independent of these priors - meaning that even those using
wildly different priors would consistently agree on the results.
The early emergence of life on Earth is naively interpreted
as meaning that if we reran the tape, life would generally
reappear quickly. But if the timescale for intelligence evolu-
tion is long, then a quick start to life is simply a necessary
byproduct of our existence - not evidence for a general rapid
abiogenesis rate. Using our objective Bayesian framework, we
show that the Bayes factor between a fast versus slow abiogen-
esis scenario, is at least a factor of three - irrespective of the
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prior or the timescale for intelligence evolution. This factor is
boosted to nine when we replace the earliest microfossil evi-
dence (15, 16, 18) with the more disputed 13C depleted zircon
deposits reported by (17). These results are also supported
by marginalizing over our objective priors. An additional
objective result concerning abiogenesis, is that the maximum
likelihood timescale for life to first appear is 190Myr after con-
ditions became habitable (4.21Gyr ago) using the microfossil
evidence, or even just 46Myr using the more disputed data.
It is emphasized that these results are conditioned solely upon
the chronology data concerning life.
We find that the rate at which intelligent observers evolve
is less well constrained. Certainly, the possibility that the rate
of intelligence emergence is rapid (Gyr) is strongly excluded,
which is not surprising given that it took several Gyr here on
Earth. But the possibility that intelligence is extremely rare
and Earth “lucked out” remains quite viable. Overall, we find
a weak preference, 3:2 betting odds, that intelligence rarely
emerges given our late arrival.
It is tempting to apply these numbers to potentially habit-
able exoplanets being discovered. However, we caution that our
analysis purely concerns the Earth, treating abiogenesis as a
stochastic process against a backdrop of events and conditions
which might be plausibly unique to the Earth. If conditions
sufficiently similar to the early conditions exist and sustain
on other worlds for a Gyr or more, then our analysis would
then favor the hypothesis that life is common, by a factor of
K > 3. However, the alternative is clearly not discounted and
our Bayes factor does not cross the threshold to which it would
be conventionally described as “strong” (K > 10) or “decisive”
(K > 100) evidence (41). Yet, future revision regarding the
earliest evidence for life could plausibly trigger this.
Overall, our work supports an optimistic outlook for fu-
ture searches for biosignatures (4–7). The slight preference
for a rare intelligence scenario is consistent with a straight-
forward resolution to the Fermi paradox. However, our work
says nothing about the lifetime of civilizations, and indeed
the weight of evidence in favor of this scenario is sufficiently
weak that searches for technosignatures should certainly be a
component in observational campaigns seeking to resolve this
grand mystery.
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Supplementary Information
Full Likelihood Function and Limiting Behavior
The main text establishes that our likelihood function is defined as (see eqns. 4-6)
L =Pr(tL < t′L, t′I < tI < t′I + t′L|λL, λI)
=
∫ t′I+t′L
tI=t′I
Pr(tL < t′L, tI |λL, λI)dtI ,
=
∫ t′I+t′L
tI=t′I
∫ t′L
tL=0
Pr(tL, tI |λL, λI)dtLdtI . [18]
In the main text this is evaluated to eqn. (7) for the case where 0 < 2t′L + t
′
I < T . The more general result is given by
Pr(tL < t′L, t
′
I < tI < t
′
I+t
′
L|λL, λI) =

(λL−λI )e−λIt
′
I (1−e−λLt
′
L )(1−e−λI (T−t
′
L
−t′
I
))
λL(1−e−λIT )−λI (1−e−λLT )
if T > 2tL + tI ,
λLe
−(λL−λI )t′L−λIT−λIe(λL−λI )(t
′
L
+t′
I
)−λLT+(λL−λI )e−λIt
′
I (1−e−λLt
′
L−e−λLt
′
I )
λL(1−e−λIT )−λI (1−e−λLT )
if T < 2tL + tI .
[19]
It is useful to inspect the limiting behavior of the likelihood function, which are depicted in the side panels of fig. 1 of the main text.
In the limit of fast abiogenesis, λL  1/t′L, one finds that
lim
λL1/t′L
L = e
−λI t′I − e−λI (t′L−t′I )
1− e−λIT , [20]
whereas in the slow limit we find
lim
λL1/t′L
L =

λI t
′
Le
−λIt′I (1−e−λIt
′
L )
λIT−(1−e−λIT )
if T > 2tL + tI ,
e
−λIt′I [λI t′L+e
−λIt′L (1−λL(T−t′I−t′L))]−e
−λI (T−t′L)
λIT−(1−e−λIT )
if T < 2tL + tI .
[21]
Similarly, one can define limits for slow and fast intelligence evolution as
lim
λI1/t′I
L = 0, [22]
and
lim
λI1/t′I
L =

λLt
′
L(1−e
−λLt′L )
λLT−(1−e−λLT )
if T > 2tL + tI ,
λLt
′
L+e
−λLt′L [1−λL(T−t′I−t′L)]−e
−λL(T−t′I−t
′
L
)
λLT−(1−e−λLT )
if T < 2tL + tI .
[23]
Finally, one can evaluate the likelihood function in the corners of the entire parameter volume taking limits of these results another
time. Since limλI1/t′I L = 0, then it makes no difference what value λL takes in along the λI  1/t
′
I axis, the result is still zero. For
the limλI1/t′I L case, we have two non-zero corners of
lim
λL1/t′L
lim
λI1/t′I
L =
{
2t′2L
T2 if T > 2tL + tI ,
2T (t′I+2t
′
L)−T2−t2I−2t′2L−4t′Lt′I
T2 if T < 2tL + tI ,
[24]
and
lim
λL1/t′L
lim
λI1/t′I
L = 2t
′
L
T
. [25]
Max Likelihoods
It is straight-forward to maximize the likelihood function as a function of the parameters λL and λI . The maximum likelihood always lies
along the λI  1/t′I axis, since the likelihood function monotonically decreases as λI increases. We therefore simply need to maximize the
function limλI1/t′I L, found earlier. Rather than do this exclusively fr the optimistic and conservative data, we repeat the calculation
along a sliding scale to illustrate the full behavior (see fig. 5).
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Fig. 5. Maximum likelihood value of 1/λL as a function of t′L (the earliest evidence for life).
Imposing Fairness on the λ Power-Law Prior
Starting from eqn. (8) of the main text, we can transform the prior into f , where f ≡ 1− e−λT using
Pr(λ)
(dλ
df
)
df = Pr(f)df [26]
and noting that λ = −T−1 log(1− f), yielding
Pr(f) =
{ 1
log(− log(1−fmax))−log(− log(1−fmin))
1
(1−f) log(− log(1−f)) if n = −1,
n+1
1−f
(− log(1−f))n
(− log(1−fmax))n+1−(− log(1−fmin))n+1 . otherwise ,
[27]
for which the more general case of n 6= 1 is given in eqn. (9) of the main text. In the above, the limits can be related as
fmin = 1− e−λminT ,
fmax = 1− e−λmaxT . [28]
Let us now consider whether this prior is biased with respect to f by evaluating the odds ratio of obtaining an a-priori low value of f
(f < 0.5) versus a high value (f > 0.5) using the definition of F given by eqn. (10) of the main text. Evaluating this function yields
F =

log
(
− log(1−fmax)log 2
)
log
(
− log 2log(1−fmin)
) if n = −1,
(log 2)n+1−(− log(1−fmax))n+1
−(log 2)n+1+(− log(1−fmin))n+1 . otherwise ,
[29]
Let’s define F ≡ log(1− f) (such that λ = −F/T ) and then set the above equal to unity and solve for Fmax to give
lim
F→1
Fmax =

(log 2)2
Fmin if n = −1,
−
(
(2 log 2)n+1 + Fmin(−Fmin)n
)1/(n+1)
. otherwise ,
[30]
And this may now be easily related back to λ as
lim
Ff→1
λmax =

(log 2)2
T2λmin
if n = −1,
T−1
(
(2 log 2)n+1 − (λminT )n+1
)1/(n+1)
. otherwise ,
[31]
Note, in order for λmax > λmin, this requires λmin < T−1 log 2 ∼ 0.14Gyr−1.
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Fig. 6. Left: The a-priori expectation value of f (the probability of at least one success in a Poisson process) for priors of the form λn when imposing a fairness using eqn. (30).
The expectation values shown are all in the limit of fmin → 0 and we find that the n = −1 (log-uniform prior) naturally recovers an unbiased result of one-half. Right:
Required λmax value to impose a fair prior as a function of λmax for several highlighted choices of n. Only n = −1 provides the necessary dynamic range to handle the
scope of our problem.
Bias in the λ Power-Law Prior
The a-priori expectation value of f should be equal to one half for an unbiaed prior. This may be evaluated through integration of
eqn. (27), yielding
E[f ] =
{
(n+1)Γ[n+1,−Fmin]−(n+1)Γ[n+1,−Fmax]−(−Fmax)n+1
(−Fmin)n+1−(−Fmax)n+1 if n = −1,
Ei[Fmin]−Ei[Fmax]+log(Fmax)−log(Fmin)
log(−Fmax)−log(−Fmin) otherwise ,
[32]
where Ei[x] is the exponential integral function. We may now replace Fmax using eqn. (30), to impose a fair prior. After doing so, we
take the limit of the expectation value as fmin → 0 and show the result as a function of n in fig. 6. This reveals that the n = −1 prior
converges to precisely one-half as desired, whereas other indices (in general) do not.
Aside from n = −1 being unbiased, we also see that n ' −0.709 appears unbiased prior too. This can be understood by the fact
that the minimum in Pr(f) occurs at exactly 1/2 when n = − log 2 = −0.693.... However, Pr(f) is not symmetric about f = 1/2 when
using n = − log 2 and thus is not a fair prior. Accordingly, a small perturbation away from n = − log 2 is needed to obtain an unbiased
distribution.
Unfortunately, it is not practical to use n = −0.709 as an alternative fair and unbiased prior. This can be understood by considering
the behavior of eqn. (31) in the limit of λmin → 0. Unless, n = −1, the limit is 21/(n+1)T−1 log 2, which in general is not large enough to
serve as a useful upper limit on the prior. For example, with T = 5Gyr and n = −0.709, this yields λmax = 1.5Gyr−1 - which means that
the posterior can never explore solutions with more than 1.5 successes per billion years. On that basis, it is argued here that this is an
overly restrictive choice of prior distribution that significantly truncates the posterior. And thus, even though an n = −0.709 power-law
prior can be fair and unbiased, it will not be considered further.
An Alternative Explanation of Prior Independent Bayes Factors
In the main text, it is shown that for the four models which define the four corners of the two-dimensional parameter volume, objective
Bayes factors can be expressed independent of the prior pi(λL, λI). We here provide an alternative explanation of this interesting feature
using the Savage-Dickey ratio instead.
This can be accomplished by first considering that the extreme modelM00 is embedded within the nested model of arbitrary {λL, λI}.
If we compare the extreme (and nested) model to the more general case, the Bayes factor will be given by the Savage-Dickey ratio (40):
Z00
Zensemble
= lim
λL1/t′L
lim
λI1/t′I
(P(λL, λI)
pi(λL, λI)
)
, [33]
where pi is the prior, P is the posterior and we use the notation “00” to denote modelM00 and “ensemble” to denote the general case
comprising the ensemble of scenarios. Note that the posterior density featured above is not marginalized, but rather directly given by the
closed form formula of our likelihood multiplied by the prior. Accordingly, prior will cancel out leaving
Z00
Zensemble
= lim
λL1/t′L
lim
λI1/t′I
L(λL, λI), [34]
thus providing a totally prior-free measure of the Bayes factor. To finish the analysis, one may now compare different extrema against
one another noting that the arbitrary “ensemble” models will cancel out. For example, (Z10/Z00) = (Z10/Zensemble)/(Z00/Zensemble).
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